Like Botswana, more countries should take steps to tackle the crime of aggression

08 May 2013

On Monday 15 April, Botswana became the first African country to sign and ratify amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that could pave way for the prosecution of the crime of aggression. In his speech ahead of the signing of the ratification document, the President of Botswana, Seretse Khama Ian Khama, reiterated the country’s commitment to international criminal justice in general and the ICC specifically in fighting impunity globally. He said that international criminal justice should not be impaired by the status of the accused and that domestic and international prosecutions are the best mechanism to respond to international crimes.

This is a welcome development and evidence of the impact of the Global Institute for the Prevention of the Crime of Aggression and the Principality of Liechtenstein’s international ratification campaign, which promotes the ratification and implementation of the Kampala amendments on the crime of aggression. The crime covers the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression by a person in a leadership position. This act of aggression must also constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Acts of aggression are any use of armed force by one state against another without the justification of self-defence or authorisation by the UN Security Council.

For African countries, the importance of allowing the ICC and its member states to prosecute the crime of aggression cannot be overstated. Indeed, Africa has historically been a victim of aggression (in various forms). In 1998 in Rome, when the Statute of the ICC was adopted, and in 2010 at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the ICC in Kampala, African states parties actively sought the inclusion and definition of the crime of aggression. However, ratifying these amendments is significant not only to Africa but to all countries – several of whom have suffered as a result of the aggression of other states.

It should be noted that in order for the ICC to begin exercising jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (at the earliest in 2017, as agreed upon by states parties to the Rome Statute in Kampala in 2010), 30 countries must ratify the amendments by 31 December 2015. Botswana, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Trinidad and Tobago, and Samoa have led the way by being the first six countries to ratify. However, 24 others will need to ratify before the deadline. While the end of 2015 might seem a far-away date, the reality is many states parties to the Rome Statute must be urged to ratify the amendments urgently. Countries like Belgium, Germany, Ghana, Lesotho, Senegal and South Africa have already begun the ratification process – albeit at different levels. It is hoped that these and several other countries actively working on the ratification will do so swiftly. There are three reasons why countries should ratify the amendments:

• Ratification would serve as a first step to promoting international peace and the rule of law.  The express prohibition of the illegal use of force contained in the definition of the crime of aggression and the threat of criminal sanction could prevent future illegal uses of force. Also, states that ratify would effectively protect themselves against aggression by another state and would publicly pledge not to commit aggression. This would be in line with the promises made at Nuremberg that never again would those who commit the crime of aggression do so with impunity following the conviction of senior German officials for waging aggressive war during the Second World War.
• The criminalisation of the crime of aggression serves to protect human rights. By their very nature, acts of aggression result in gross human rights violations and the violation of international humanitarian law. Those who often end up counting the cost of aggression are the most vulnerable of society, particularly women and children.
• Ratification reflects continued support for the ICC and international criminal justice. While the 122 countries that have ratified the Rome Statute have already shown their commitment, ratifying the amendments would serve to bolster this commitment.

Nevertheless, the inclusion and definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute is not without its challenges and detractors. Indeed, at the time that the Rome Statute was being considered, the issue of whether or not to include the crime of aggression was the subject of immense debate. Countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, who prosecuted aggression at Nuremberg, were ironically the ones who argued against its inclusion. Their concerns related to legal constraints on their ability to mount military or humanitarian interventions. Further, it was (and has been) argued that the crime of aggression is an issue of a political rather than a legal nature and should thus remain the remit of the UN Security Council, not a judicial body such as the ICC.

A large contingent of states (from Africa, the Arab world, Europe and those that are non-aligned) supported its inclusion in the Rome Statute. The resultant statute incorporated the crime of aggression, but did not define the crime and put off the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over this crime until such a time as a definition was agreed. This definition was agreed upon in 2010 and can be seen as a compromise between the two divergent views on the crime. However, the ability of the ICC to exercise such jurisdiction was postponed until at least 2017.

The adoption of a definition on the crime of aggression and the inclusion of additional war crimes in the Rome Statute was a giant leap for international criminal justice. It was a further affirmation by states of their commitment to international justice, peace and security. The crime of aggression, unlike the other offences under the Rome Statute, specifically targets national leaders who are in a position to effectively exercise control over or direct the political or military action of a state. The prosecution of this offence by the ICC will ensure accountability for the most serious illegal uses of force against other states. The journey, however, has been arduous and could remain so if states do not follow through on their affirmation by ratifying. Indeed, states should be seen to actively commit to international criminal justice rather than merely making declarations. Without action, these declarations may be viewed as nothing more than empty promises.

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

A warlord faces justice at the ICC after six years on the run

 27 March 2013

 

On Tuesday 26 March, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel leader accused by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), appeared for the first time before the court. The appearance came a week after Ntaganda handed himself over to United States (US) embassy officials in Kigali, Rwanda and requested immediate transfer to the ICC. Through the cooperation of US and Rwandese authorities, Ntaganda was sent to the ICC on 22 March. While the reasons for his surrender are unclear, what is apparent is that Ntaganda has chosen to face justice at the ICC instead of continuing life as a fugitive.

The significance of this, for the ICC and international criminal justice in general, cannot be underestimated for a number of reasons. First, Ntaganda – after almost seven years on the run – is the first person for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant who has voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Eleven others for whom arrest warrants have been issued for situations in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Sudan and Uganda remain at large.

Second, the ICC received ready cooperation from the US and Rwanda. Both countries have not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC and thus have no direct obligations to the court. Despite this, their decisions to cooperate with the court and swiftly transfer Ntaganda to The Hague are indicative of support for international criminal justice.

Third, Ntaganda’s surrender comes at a time when the DRC is embroiled in ongoing conflict in the eastern provinces of the country. Ntaganda is said to have been integral in stoking the conflict in various ways from mid-1990 to date. However, it should be borne in mind that the crimes for which Ntaganda is presently charged relate to his activities in the eastern DRC region of Ituri (north of the war-torn Kivu provinces that border Rwanda) between 1 September 2002 and the end of September 2003.

For his alleged involvement in the Ituri conflict, Ntaganda – a Rwandan-born Congolese citizen – is charged with seven counts of war crimes, including the enlistment and conscription of children under the age of 15, the use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, murder, attacks against the civilian population, rape and sexual slavery, and pillaging; and three counts of the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and sexual slavery, and persecution. During the time these offences were supposedly committed, Ntaganda was allegedly serving as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, or FPLC), the military arm of the Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, or UPC), a rebel movement in the eastern DRC. In this capacity, it is believed that Ntaganda reported directly to Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Lubanga Dyilo, currently in detention, made news in 2012 when he was the first person convicted by the ICC for the enlistment and use of children to actively participate in hostilities.

In addition to his involvement with the FPLC, Ntaganda – nicknamed ‘The Terminator’ – has over the years fought for several rebel groups. In the early 1990s, Ntaganda fought with the Rwandan Patriotic Army and from 2006 he was linked to the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, or CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda. Ntaganda is also one of the key figures allegedly behind the November 2008 Kiwanja massacre in which approximately 150 people were summarily executed in under two days.

Despite all this, Ntaganda was integrated into the Congolese army following the attempt at demilitarisation and reintegration of rebels from the CNDP, and the Congolese government made no effort to arrest and transfer him to the ICC. At the time of his surrender, Ntaganda had defected from the army and had been linked to another rebel movement, the M23, from early 2012. It is believed that the splitting of the M23 in February 2013 following infighting prompted Ntaganda to flee from the DRC to Rwanda.

Despite several promises (and having previously cooperated with the ICC), the Congolese government did not arrest Ntaganda. Interestingly, the DRC itself has over the years issued arrest warrants for Ntaganda for allegedly committing, among other offences, torture, murder, illegal detention and arbitrary arrest. These warrants of arrest and those issued by the ICC were not executed, which further frustrated those who wanted to bring Ntaganda to justice.

The failure by the Congolese government to arrest Ntaganda and transfer him to the ICC – as it had done with Lubanga Dyilo – highlighted one of the major challenges facing the court: that it does not have its own police force and so relies on support and cooperation from Rome Statute states parties to make arrests. Ntaganda’s decision to surrender himself to the court is significant because it shows that the ICC can secure indictees for trial if they voluntarily surrender, even to non-state parties that are not bound by the ICC’s statute.

There are three ways in which an ICC accused can come before the court. First, when a summons to appear is issued, the accused can voluntarily present him or herself to the ICC. Second, when an arrest warrant is issued, the authorities in a particular state can apprehend and surrender the accused to the ICC. Third, when an accused for whom an arrest warrant has been issued hands him or herself over to the court. Given that when arrest warrants are issued this is done precisely because it is doubtful that a suspect will voluntarily appear, the third option – which Ntaganda recently took – tends to be the least likely. More so for ICC cases, which tend to focus on people in positions of power because of the prosecutorial strategy of going after those most responsible for international crimes.

Ntaganda`s appearance in the dock at the ICC on 26 March sends a strong message to perpetrators of international crimes that they too may face justice one day – whether they are delivered to court after arrest or because circumstances push them to voluntarily surrender. While this is only the beginning of the proceedings against Ntaganda, it is a highlight at a time when the ICC continues to struggle with securing the arrest of individuals like Ugandan Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan.


Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

Original posting: http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1615 

Democracy dependent *only* on elections? No!

Elections as the primary determination of a democratic process leave a sour taste in my mouth… 

 How GW Bush notoriously "won" by the skin of his rigging teeth in 2004 and how many others "win" after a low voter turnout. But even when the turnout is high, elections do not truly glean the "will of ALL the people, by ALL the people, for ALL the people."

On 4 March, 50,03 % of voters elected Uhuru Kenyatta & his running mate William Samoei Ruto to the Kenyan Presidency. Former foes who formed an alliance to strengthen chances of election. A strategic choice. Great on them, but 50,03 in real terms is 6 173 433 of 12 338 667 votes counted. 50.03% of 29.7% of the population (est* 41 609 728 as of 2011) in real terms means less than 15% of the population have decided the "fate" of the other +85%... *sigh* 

That being said, the will of the people can still be done if those elected into office serve the interests of their country's population... The trouble is: Do they ever?

They tell us colonialism ended, but I don't hear them...

Graphic: Out of Africa – Did the Colonial Powers ever Really Leave?

Richard Johnson "Africa may have achieved independence, but the old colonial ties are still important as France’s decision to send troops to Mali to fight Islamist extremists shows. The old colonial powers in Africa may no longer be the rulers, but they still exert influence and have strong economic and political links. David McDonald, professor of the Global Development Studies at Queen’s University, says, “The French and the English were much more strategic in terms of recognizing that they wanted to maintain neo-colonial linkages with their former colonies. So it was shedding the direct authoritarian power at the barrel of a gun and replacing that with independence, but an independence that was, and is still to some extent, extremely dependent on the political and economic will of the former colonial masters.” – The National Post’s Rubab Abid and Richard Johnson look at the former colonies and former colonial powers who still dabble inside the continent they once owned."

 Source:

 http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/01/18/graphic-out-of-africa-did-the-colonial-powers-ever-really-leave/

Contact Richard Johnson: rjohnson@nationalpost.com

Uganda Coalition on the International Criminal Court (UCICC) Annual Publication

Uganda Coalition on the International Criminal Court (UCICC)  

The Forum Magazine 2012


"This issue contains analyses of both critical and pro ICC nature. It is inclusive of different opinions, perceptions and misconceptions surrounding the work of the ICC, since the time of establishment.

This issue is most important for views on the work and impact of the ICC and outstanding considerations are:

(1) What have been the roles of the ICC as a world court since the time of establishment?

(2) The impact of the ICC since establishment.

(3) The common challenges faced by the ICC since the time of establishment.

(4) The different perceptions and misconceptions about the ICC as being another form of neo-colonialism.

(5) The future prospects of the ICC as a world court for future fair delivery of justice and the elimination of impunity.

The forum endeavours to uncover all minds of the researchers, academia and Civil Society Organizations. It is an opportunity for expression of thoughts geared towards the creation of a platform that is essentially beneficial to both the national and International community."

Download the PDF: http://www.ucicc.org/attachments/article/22/The%20Forum%20Magazine%20Issue%20No.%203,%202012%20%20Final%20Copy.pdf

African Efforts to Close the Impunity Gap

ISS Paper 241: 

Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions

Max du Plessis, Antoinette Louw & 

Ottilia Maunganidze

The position taken by the African Union towards the ICC creates the impression that African states are resistant to international criminal justice. This paper argues that the reality is quite different. The continent provides many examples of international justice in practice. A review of selected domestic and regional efforts suggests that a richer understanding of the Rome Statute’s ‘complementarity’ scheme is developing – one involving states, regional organisations and civil society working to close the impunity gap. Such actions are giving effect to the notion that while the ICC can provide justice through a few highly publicised trials, for justice to be brought home in any meaningful way, domestic action is essential.  

The publication of this paper was made possible with the support of the Governments of the Netherlands and Norway.

Download the full paper:  http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper241.pdf

Power and Prosecution - Pouvoir et Poursuite

Kai Ambos  & Ottilia Anna Maunganidze (Eds.)

Power and Prosecution - Pouvoir et Poursuite

Challenges and Opportunities for International Criminal Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa - Défis et Opportunités pour la Justice Pénale Internationale en Afrique SubSaharienne

Göttinger Studien zu den Kriminalwissenschaften - Band 24

This book contains some of the papers that were presented at the fi rst meeting of the newly formed African Expert Study Group on International Criminal Law/ Groupe des Experts Africaines en Droit Pénal International held in September 2011 in Brussels, Belgium. The group was established under the auspices of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue (hereinafter ‘MDPD’) and the Rule of Law programme of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (‘KAS’) in 2010 modeled on the successful sister group in Latin America. This latter group was originally founded as an expert group to monitor the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) in Latin America within the framework of cooperation between KAS’ regional Rule of Law Programme and the Department for Foreign and International Law of the Institute for Criminal Law and Criminal Justice of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in 2002. 

The newly formed African group consists of judicial experts with both academic and practical background from various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The importance of such a group for the African continent cannot be overestimated. Africa plays a vital role in international criminal law and justice, both as an active player at the ICC and at the regional and national level. As for the group’s composition and outreach, the aim is to broaden regional representation and further consolidate membership. In 2012, the group will meet in Nairobi, Kenya to deal with topics surrounding the ‘Potential for the domestic prosecution of international crimes in Africa.’ 

Topics for future meetings abound given the multi-faceted African legal and political practice regarding international criminal justice in general and the ICC in particular. The group should in particular monitor the recent international or transnational criminal justice developments at the regional African level as well as relevant national developments. (Excerpt from the introduction by Kai Ambos)

Published: 2012

Book launch: http://www.kas.de/bruessel/en/events/52492/

Download: http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/univerlag/2012/GSK24_ambos_power.pdf 

Purchase Softcover, 202 S.: 26,00 Euro
(ISBN 978-3-86395-078-1)  http://www.univerlag.uni-goettingen.de/content/list.php?q=Kai+Ambos&cat=result&details=isbn-978-3-86395-078-1

Implications of Another African Case as Mali Self-refers to the ICC

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze & Antoinette Louw,  Researcher & Senior Research Fellow,  Transnational Threats and International Crimes Division, ISS Pretoria

On 18 July 2012, Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), released a press statement confirming receipt of a referral of the situation in Mali by the country’s interim Minister of Justice. In terms of the 13 July 2012 referral letter, the government of Mali alleges that gross human rights violations and war crimes have been committed in the country, especially in the northern region. The alleged crimes include the summary executions of soldiers, rape of women and young girls, killing of civilians, the recruitment of child soldiers, torture, pillaging, enforced disappearances, and the destruction of property (including government buildings, humanitarian installations, religious establishments and gravesites). The prosecutor indicated that her office would conduct preliminary investigations into the alleged international crimes in accordance with the Rome Statute of the ICC.

The referral is the first received by the new prosecutor since she took office on 15 June this year. Notably, Mali is the fifth African country that has formally requested the ICC to investigate crimes in its territory and, if formal investigations are instituted, will be the eighth situation before the ICC – all of which are in Africa. This additional African situation comes at a time when the ICC is under fire for not opening investigations in other parts of the world. Some critics even go so far as to contend that the ICC is targeting Africa. 

As the new prosecutor begins her tenure at the ICC, it is widely agreed that one of her office’s main challenges is to ensure that the court rebuilds its legitimacy, especially in Africa. To do so the ICC must open formal investigations into situations outside the continent. However, this is easier said than done, as the additional self-referral by Mali – an African country – shows. Although self-referrals do signify support for the ICC by the governments concerned, they are not without their own controversies. For the most part, self-referrals now elicit more scepticism than compliments for the ICC. This has been the case with the self-referrals made by the governments of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as the Côte d’Ivoire case, which – although not a member of the ICC’s Rome Statute – requested the ICC’s intervention after accepting the court’s jurisdiction. In all four cases, allegations are that these requests were intended to cripple government adversaries rather than end impunity for grave crimes, or that the cases represent `victor`s justice` rather than real justice for all sides to the conflict. 

Similar criticisms are likely to be levelled at the Mali referral for a number of reasons. Politically, the stakes for control over a new government are now high. The violence that grips the country followed a coup d’état staged by mutinying soldiers. The coup, which began on 21 March 2012 when soldiers seized the presidential palace, state media and other buildings, forced then president Amadou Toumani Touré into hiding and eventually led to his resignation on 8 April. Consequently, the country’s constitution was suspended. The situation in Mali prior to and after the coup has been tense. At present, an interim government – comprised mostly of technocrats – that was formed following the resignation of the president is running the country. This situation has been exacerbated by the Tuareg insurgency in the north of the country, where rebels have taken control of most of northern Mali and declared the independent nation of Azawad. The self-referral could thus be characterised as an attempt by the interim government – which is weak and in search of support and legitimacy both locally and abroad – to put down the rebellion in the north, and eliminate opposition from those who might seek to destabilise a new government.

The political context aside, the Mali referral nevertheless signals welcome and continued support for the ICC and its goals in Africa. First, Mali’s decision to refer shows that the government would like to see an end to the commission of international crimes within the country and that it believes the ICC can help in achieving this. Second (and unlike any of the other self-referrals), the Mali referral has the support of the West African region: on 9 July 2012 ECOWAS’ Contact Group on Mali (composed of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria and Togo) recommended that the situation be referred to the ICC. The seven-country contact group also called for the formation of a government of national unity, having already (on 15 May) released a statement accusing the military junta of blocking the return to civilian rule and threatening to impose sanctions.

With political support from both Mali and ECOWAS in place it is now up to the ICC to proceed in a manner that mitigates the criticisms that have been levelled at the other self-referrals. A procedural and transparent approach that emphasises the requirements of the Rome Statute at every step will assist in this regard. For example, if the ICC initiates formal investigations in Mali, it will be doing so in line with article 17 of the Rome Statute that allows the court to intervene only if the government in the country concerned is unwilling or unable to take action. Noting that Mali’s current government is an interim administration, it is unlikely to have the capacity to prosecute the alleged perpetrators itself even if the political will to do so exists. Thus a referral by Mali signifies commitment by the state to end impunity and paves the way for future cooperation with the ICC in respect of investigations and possible arrests. (It is worth noting that this is an important consideration that lends support to cases coming to the ICC via self-referrals: the court lacks its own police force, which means it relies heavily on the cooperation of the states in which it works. Practically, self-referrals are understandably an attractive option for the ICC.) 

The ‘willing and able’ test referred to above forms part of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)’s obligations under article 53 of the Rome Statute to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into the situation in Mali. To do this, the prosecution must determine whether the ICC has jurisdiction, whether the matter is admissible, and whether proceedings would be in the interests of justice. If the OTP decides to proceed, it is imperative that investigations cover all sides to the conflict from the outset in order to offset accusations that self-referrals result in victor’s justice. These procedures, and their outcomes, need to be publicly explained by the OTP. This is neither an unreasonable requirement nor something foreign to the work of a prosecutor. At the national level prosecutions do not occur in a vacuum, with local courts similarly being vulnerable to abuse by political leaders determined to sideline their opposition. The onus is therefore on the OTP to carefully manage the selection of cases and subsequent investigations and prosecutions. Doing so will help ameliorate negative perceptions about the ICC.

Although it’s still early days, the OTP’s statement on the Mali self-referral demonstrates an awareness of the sensitivities around these types of cases. In her statement Bensouda outlines clearly the origins of the referral, and the steps, in terms of the Rome Statute, that the OTP will now take to determine whether a formal investigation can be launched. This approach is a good start and should assist the ICC in building its legitimacy despite the addition of yet another African situation to the court’s caseload.
 

Malawi's Stance on al-Bashir is in Line with its International Obligations

On Friday 8 June 2012, the cabinet of Malawi resolved not to host the next African Union (AU) Summit because the AU insisted that all Heads of State - including Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir - be invited to attend.

Al-Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide allegedly committed in Darfur. The decision by Malawi's President Joyce Banda not to allow al-Bashir into her country because of Malawi's international obligations has led to widespread reaction throughout Africa.

Malawi's Vice-President Khumbo Kachali made the announcement on Friday 8 June that Malawi would not submit to pressure from the AU to invite Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to the upcoming AU summit. Kachali stated that, 'much as Malawi has obligations to the AU, it also has other obligations (and) the Cabinet has decided not to host the summit'.

It has been widely reported that President Joyce Banda's decision not to invite al-Bashir and the pursuant decision by the Malawi cabinet are informed by the country's efforts to regain international favour. This kind of speculation could have political implications for Malawi, especially for its relationship with the AU going forward. The political issues surrounding this decision have unfortunately overshadowed the legal dimension of the issue. Of importance in this regard are the United Nations (UN) Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. All these instruments, which are binding on Malawi, have specific provisions aimed at promoting global peace and the rule of law, and ending impunity.

First, the UN Charter enunciates as one of its principles the need to maintain international peace and security. Malawi, as a member state of the UN, is bound to its decisions. Under Article 103, the UN Charter provides that obligations under the Charter prevail over any other obligations if there is a conflict. It should be noted that the situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1593 in 2005. The UN Security Council invoked its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and provisions in the ICC Statute to oblige the Government of Sudan and 'all other parties to the conflict in Darfur' to cooperate with the ICC (which includes the arrest and surrender of suspects to the court).

Second, one of the primary objectives of the AU is to achieve peace and security in Africa. Specifically, the Constitutive Act of the AU provides a legal framework for the continental organ to fight impunity. Articles 4(h) and (o) of the Constitutive Act authorise the AU to intervene in member states to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and ultimately to prevent impunity. However, it should be noted that this intervention is often political.

Last, but certainly not least, is the fact that Malawi's decision is in line with the country's responsibilities under the Rome Statute of the ICC. As an ICC member state, Malawi is obliged to cooperate fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and where requested to arrest al-Bashir (and any other suspects wanted by the ICC) if he visits the country and surrender him to the court. Malawi's decision to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the ICC should he enter its territory is not unique. Indeed, Malawi's stance is not the first, nor shall it - hopefully - be the last in Africa.

In April 2009, al-Bashir - although invited - decided not to travel to South Africa to attend President Jacob Zuma's inauguration. This decision came after South African authorities and civil society took steps to exercise the country's domestic and international criminal law obligations with regard to al-Bashir. Following similar actions by governments and African civil society organisations, other states have found diplomatic solutions to either avoid al-Bashir's visits or move the venue of important meetings to the territory of non-states parties.

Notably, al-Bashir cancelled trips to Uganda in 2009 and 2010 over fears that he would be arrested, and also did not attend Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's inauguration in May 2011. Furthermore,
al-Bashir did not attend the ceremony of the 50th anniversary of the independence of the Central African Republic (CAR) in December 2010. Both Uganda and CAR are states parties to the ICC Statute and referred the situations in their respective countries for investigation and prosecution at the ICC. Later that December, al-Bashir cancelled his trip to Zambia (also a state party to the ICC Statute) to attend the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region following international protest. Instead, Sudanese foreign minister Ali Karti and minerals minister Abdel-Baki Al-Gailani attended the summit. Other African countries like Botswana have made it clear that al-Bashir is not welcome.

Nevertheless, since the arrest warrant was issued in 2009, al-Bashir has been able to travel to several countries that are obliged to arrest and surrender him to the ICC, including ICC member states Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, and Malawi in 2010 and 2011. It is worth noting that following his first visit to Kenya in August 2010, civil society action resulted in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) moving its October 2010 special summit on Sudan from Nairobi to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to
avert a potential diplomatic quandary over al-Bashir's attendance. Further, civil society was in 2011 able to secure a warrant for his arrest from a Kenyan High Court, thereby preventing subsequent visits.

It is clear that African states are divided on the al-Bashir issue. This is despite AU decisions in 2009, 2010, 2011 and January 2012 in which the AU called on all its member states not to cooperate with the ICC in respect of al-Bashir's arrest warrants. The AU argues that, as a head of state, al-Bashir enjoys immunity and should therefore not be prosecuted while in office. The AU also contends that arresting al-Bashir would not be in the interests of peace and would undermine its ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Sudan and South Sudan.

Despite the AU's decisions on al-Bashir, the facts of the Sudanese president's trips noted above show that some African states have chosen to abide by their domestic and international legal obligations rather than the AU position. These countries, some of which have vowed to arrest al-Bashir, are acting consistently with the rule of law requirements of international criminal justice. However, others abide by the AU decisions even though this means flouting the rules of the ICC.

Interestingly, some countries like Malawi have shown a shift in opinion. In October 2011, before the death of Malawi's former President Bingu wa Mutharika, al-Bashir was able to travel to that country for a regional economic summit. However, with the change in government, the stance in Malawi on international criminal justice has also significantly shifted. But is it enough?

The fact that al-Bashir has not yet been arrested and surrendered to the ICC is evidence that for international criminal justice to succeed, countries, especially ICC states parties, must do more than take principled positions. They must be ready and able to apprehend people indicted by the ICC. It is the lack of full commitment to cooperating with the ICC that led the court's outgoing chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to request the UN Security Council to consider calling on all UN member states and regional organisations to carry out the arrest warrants for al-Bashir and other indicted Sudanese officials. It remains to be seen whether the UN Security Council will oblige and what implications such a move will have.

Malawi should be applauded for its principled and legally correct position on al-Bashir. At the same time, the AU's determination to bring together all heads of state, especially those directly involved in continental conflicts, is understandable and in line with its chief mandate to promote peace and security. Thus moving the summit to a non-state party to the ICC is arguably the right result under the circumstances. However, it is unfortunate that once again peace and justice have been set up against each other in such a polarising manner. It will serve the interests of peace, justice and the rule of law if African leaders are proactive in finding solutions that are both diplomatic and not in breach of international law.

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze is a researcher in the Transnational Threats and International Crime Division of the ISS www.issafrica.org

Libyan NTC Must Commit to Criminal Justice to Bolster Credibility

JURIST Guest Columnist Ottilia Maunganidze, Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, says that for the NTC to establish credibility it must put an end to unlawful detentions, make certain that any arrests are carried out by lawful police forces and ensure humane treatment of detainees...

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On January 26, 2012, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, made a statement before the UN Security Council on the current human rights situation in Libya. In her statement, she highlighted key issues related to the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights. Pillay noted that the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya has taken some positive measures since coming into power in October 2011. However, she also highlighted that there had been reports of human rights abuses and that over 8,000 supporters loyal to the late leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, were arbitrarily detained and are being held in appalling conditions. Pillay's statement to the Security Council came just weeks before human rights advocacy organization Amnesty International (AI) released a report accusing the NTC of allowing the abuse and torture of supporters of former leader Gaddafi by unofficial militia. The AI report of February 16, 2012 underscores Pillay's concerns. The report itself is a product of an AI fact-finding mission to Libya in January and February 2012. The mission visited 11 facilities in Tripoli, al-Zawiya, Gharyan, Misrata and Sirte. The facilities are all currently used as detention facilities for suspected Gaddafi loyalists.

AI's report details systematic human rights abuses by militia of people in custody. People interviewed provided details of different forms of torture and resultant grievous bodily harm. According to the report, the alleged forms of torture used by the militia include, but are not limited to, beatings using various instruments such as sticks, whips and rifle butts. Several of the people interviewed by the AI mission said they suffered other forms of torture, including electric shocks, burns and threats of rape or death. In addition to those allegedly tortured, the mission also found that 12 detainees had died in custody.
Aid agency Medecins San Frontieres (MSF) has supported the findings of this report and Pillay's statement to the Security Council. According to the MSF, forensic examinations of some of those who died in detention provide evidence that such methods are still being used. Furthermore, MSF reports that some of their staff were asked by the militia in detention in Misrata to patch up prisoners midway through torture sessions so they could be taken back for more abuse. MSF in January said that its doctors had treated 115 people since August 2011 who had torture-related wounds and of those two people had died.
If the reported human rights violations are true and the militia is responsible for them, then the militia has violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, two international agreements to which Libya is a party. The ICCPR provides that everyone has the right to life and further that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." In addition, both the ICCPR and the Torture Convention expressly provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the alleged perpetrators should be brought to book for the acts of torture and the reported deaths. The AI report recommends that the NTC abruptly put an end to the unlawful detentions and ensure that any arrests are carried out by lawful police forces, ensure humane treatment of detainees and investigate the reported deaths of prisoners. However, as noted by Pillay, the reason that these crimes have gone largely unpunished is because the NTC seems to lack the requisite systems to oversee activities across the country. Consequently, some regions are not governed by the NTC, but instead by the militia.

In 2011, the NTC vowed to investigate allegations of human rights abuses after AI released their September 2011 report, which alleged that both sides to the Libyan conflict were responsible for human rights violations. The NTC also currently has in detention International Criminal Court (ICC) accused Saif al-Islam and Abdullah al-Senussi, who they intend to prosecute domestically despite criticisms from the ICC and the international community. Indeed, to date, no efforts have been made to freely and fairly prosecute both sides to the conflict. Unfortunately, this state of affairs closely mirrors the lack of commitment to criminal justice on the part of the Gaddafi government throughout his 42-year rule. If the NTC is to establish itself as a legitimate government, it will need to address this fundamental issue as well as ensure that it has authority over areas currently controlled by different militia groups.

Ottilia Maunganidze is a Researcher for the International Crime in Africa Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. Her main focus is on criminal justice mechanisms to deal with international crimes and the promotion and protection of human rights. Previously, she worked as a research intern for the African Security Analysis Programme, as a junior legal advisor at the Rhodes University Legal Aid Clinic, and as a student human rights education coordinator for the Rhodes University chapter of Amnesty International.

Suggested citation: Ottilia Maunganidze, NTC Must Commit to Criminal Justice to Bolster Credibility, JURIST - Hotline, Feb. 27, 2012, http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/02/ottilia-maunganidze-ntc-detentions.php.