Does the ICC case against Kenya's leaders undermine international peace and security?

13 November 2013

On 5 November 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) began handling the request to defer the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) cases in the Kenyan situation. The request, which was submitted on 1 November for consideration by non-permanent members Rwanda, Togo and Morocco under instruction from the African Union (AU), relates specifically to the cases against Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto.

Kenyatta and Ruto (together with Kenyan journalist Joshua Sang) face charges related to the violence that erupted after Kenya’s December 2007 elections, in which over 1 100 people died. Ruto and Sang’s trial began in September 2013, while Kenyatta’s trial is due to start on 5 February 2014 after a third postponement.

In October this year, the AU held an extraordinary summit at which the relationship between the ICC and Africa was discussed. Central to the discussions was the fact that all cases currently before the ICC are from African countries, including the indictment of two sitting heads of state. In its 12 October 2013 decision, the AU called for the Kenyan cases to be deferred and asked that the UNSC provide feedback on the deferral request by 12 November 2013, the date on which Kenyatta’s trial was scheduled to start.

Given that Kenyatta’s trial has been provisionally moved to February 2014, it remains to be seen whether the AU will still expect the UNSC to make a decision on deferral immediately. As things stand, the UNSC agenda for November does not include a session to discuss the deferral request. However, this is not to say such discussions will not be held, as the programme of work can be updated at any time.

Even if heard, despite support from Russia and China, the likelihood of the deferral being granted is slim, given that the United States, United Kingdom and France, who all hold the power to veto resolutions, insist that the ICC’s postponement of Kenyatta’s trial to February next year was sufficient. The views of the five permanent members of the UNSC notwithstanding, it is essential to assess the merits of the deferral request itself.

Article 16 of the ICC’s Rome Statute, in terms of which deferral requests can be made, statesthat ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with … for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the court to that effect ….’ Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UNSC to take measures to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ if it has determined ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression’.

First, it is clear that Article 16 is intended for use in exceptional circumstances. Indeed, the UNSC has not, to date, deferred any ICC investigation or prosecution. The question now is whether continuing the court processes would undermine international peace and security. The AU’s request stresses that Kenya’s leaders need to focus on the ongoing fight against terrorism, especially following the attack on Westgate mall in September. They contend that having the president and deputy president of the country on trial jeopardises this.
This is not a widely supported view. Notably, Kenyan human rights organisations, in a letter to the president of the UNSC, stated that conflating the two issues would undermine accountability. The organisations emphasised that deferral on this basis would actually further embed impunity, which lends itself to susceptibility to terrorism.It cannot be denied that terrorism is a serious threat in Kenya and the Horn of Africa region. However, the UNSC has to decide whether this suffices as a basis upon which to allege that continuing the trials will compromise international peace and security. Indeed, counter-terrorism and international criminal justice are bedfellows in that they both seek to address serious crimes that have an adverse effect on global peace and security, and where the two intersect a balance must be struck. One should not be preferred over the other.

Second, the AU claims that by virtue of their positions as president and deputy president of Kenya, the two accused should not, for the duration of their terms, be prosecuted. The AU argues that doing so would undermine Kenyatta and Ruto’s official duties. If the deferral were granted on this basis, it would contradict Article 27 of the Rome Statute (which denies immunity for heads of state and other senior government officials). Significantly, it would mean the deferral would have to be renewed every 12 months for the duration of the Kenyan presidential term of five years. Presupposing that Kenyatta runs for a second term and wins, the deferral would have to be extended for a further five years.

This, as noted by Fergal Gaynor, the legal representative of victims in the case against Kenyatta, would further unduly delay any justice for the victims – assuming that Kenyatta is indeed found guilty. Similar sentiments have been voiced by civil society, including the Kenyan Human Rights Commission and the International Center for Policy and Conflict. Importantly, this argument of the AU contradicts Article 2(6) and Article 143(4) of the Kenyan constitution. Article 143(4) specifically prohibits the president’s immunity from criminal prosecution for ‘crime[s] for which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and which prohibits such immunity’. The deputy president enjoys no immunity from prosecution under the Kenyan constitution.

Third, the AU contends that the criminal justice reforms undertaken in Kenya sufficiently allow for national prosecutions of those responsible for the post-election violence. While, on the face of it, this is in line with the ICC’s role as a court of last resort and is thus commendable, it is not a basis for deferral. Indeed, this was the primary basis of Kenya’s own deferral request made directly to the ICC in 2011, which the Court rejected. Supposing the criminal justice reforms were considered in making the decision, the argument ignores the fact that despite these reforms, there have been few prosecutions and convictions for serious crimes committed during the post-election violence. More importantly, if the ICC is to reconsider its jurisdiction in this situation, the Kenyans who stand accused by the Court are unlikely to be prosecuted domestically.

Further, in early September, Kenya’s parliament passed motions aimed at withdrawing Kenya from the Rome Statute and repealing the country’s International Crimes Act, which, among other things, provides a basis for the prosecution of ICC crimes in Kenya. This move would mean that not only are the president and his deputy free from prosecution for international crimes, but so are all Kenyans. This goes against the spirit and purpose of international criminal justice and is a blatant denial of recourse to justice for the victims of international crimes.
These are the key matters that the UNSC must grapple with in deciding whether or not to defer the ICC cases against Kenyatta and Ruto. At the end of the day, this will be put to a vote. A resolution on deferral can only be passed if at least nine countries are in favour and none of the five permanent members use their veto. That is unlikely, but not impossible.

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

A warlord faces justice at the ICC after six years on the run

 27 March 2013

 

On Tuesday 26 March, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel leader accused by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), appeared for the first time before the court. The appearance came a week after Ntaganda handed himself over to United States (US) embassy officials in Kigali, Rwanda and requested immediate transfer to the ICC. Through the cooperation of US and Rwandese authorities, Ntaganda was sent to the ICC on 22 March. While the reasons for his surrender are unclear, what is apparent is that Ntaganda has chosen to face justice at the ICC instead of continuing life as a fugitive.

The significance of this, for the ICC and international criminal justice in general, cannot be underestimated for a number of reasons. First, Ntaganda – after almost seven years on the run – is the first person for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant who has voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Eleven others for whom arrest warrants have been issued for situations in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Sudan and Uganda remain at large.

Second, the ICC received ready cooperation from the US and Rwanda. Both countries have not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC and thus have no direct obligations to the court. Despite this, their decisions to cooperate with the court and swiftly transfer Ntaganda to The Hague are indicative of support for international criminal justice.

Third, Ntaganda’s surrender comes at a time when the DRC is embroiled in ongoing conflict in the eastern provinces of the country. Ntaganda is said to have been integral in stoking the conflict in various ways from mid-1990 to date. However, it should be borne in mind that the crimes for which Ntaganda is presently charged relate to his activities in the eastern DRC region of Ituri (north of the war-torn Kivu provinces that border Rwanda) between 1 September 2002 and the end of September 2003.

For his alleged involvement in the Ituri conflict, Ntaganda – a Rwandan-born Congolese citizen – is charged with seven counts of war crimes, including the enlistment and conscription of children under the age of 15, the use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, murder, attacks against the civilian population, rape and sexual slavery, and pillaging; and three counts of the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and sexual slavery, and persecution. During the time these offences were supposedly committed, Ntaganda was allegedly serving as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, or FPLC), the military arm of the Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, or UPC), a rebel movement in the eastern DRC. In this capacity, it is believed that Ntaganda reported directly to Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Lubanga Dyilo, currently in detention, made news in 2012 when he was the first person convicted by the ICC for the enlistment and use of children to actively participate in hostilities.

In addition to his involvement with the FPLC, Ntaganda – nicknamed ‘The Terminator’ – has over the years fought for several rebel groups. In the early 1990s, Ntaganda fought with the Rwandan Patriotic Army and from 2006 he was linked to the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, or CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda. Ntaganda is also one of the key figures allegedly behind the November 2008 Kiwanja massacre in which approximately 150 people were summarily executed in under two days.

Despite all this, Ntaganda was integrated into the Congolese army following the attempt at demilitarisation and reintegration of rebels from the CNDP, and the Congolese government made no effort to arrest and transfer him to the ICC. At the time of his surrender, Ntaganda had defected from the army and had been linked to another rebel movement, the M23, from early 2012. It is believed that the splitting of the M23 in February 2013 following infighting prompted Ntaganda to flee from the DRC to Rwanda.

Despite several promises (and having previously cooperated with the ICC), the Congolese government did not arrest Ntaganda. Interestingly, the DRC itself has over the years issued arrest warrants for Ntaganda for allegedly committing, among other offences, torture, murder, illegal detention and arbitrary arrest. These warrants of arrest and those issued by the ICC were not executed, which further frustrated those who wanted to bring Ntaganda to justice.

The failure by the Congolese government to arrest Ntaganda and transfer him to the ICC – as it had done with Lubanga Dyilo – highlighted one of the major challenges facing the court: that it does not have its own police force and so relies on support and cooperation from Rome Statute states parties to make arrests. Ntaganda’s decision to surrender himself to the court is significant because it shows that the ICC can secure indictees for trial if they voluntarily surrender, even to non-state parties that are not bound by the ICC’s statute.

There are three ways in which an ICC accused can come before the court. First, when a summons to appear is issued, the accused can voluntarily present him or herself to the ICC. Second, when an arrest warrant is issued, the authorities in a particular state can apprehend and surrender the accused to the ICC. Third, when an accused for whom an arrest warrant has been issued hands him or herself over to the court. Given that when arrest warrants are issued this is done precisely because it is doubtful that a suspect will voluntarily appear, the third option – which Ntaganda recently took – tends to be the least likely. More so for ICC cases, which tend to focus on people in positions of power because of the prosecutorial strategy of going after those most responsible for international crimes.

Ntaganda`s appearance in the dock at the ICC on 26 March sends a strong message to perpetrators of international crimes that they too may face justice one day – whether they are delivered to court after arrest or because circumstances push them to voluntarily surrender. While this is only the beginning of the proceedings against Ntaganda, it is a highlight at a time when the ICC continues to struggle with securing the arrest of individuals like Ugandan Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan.


Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

Original posting: http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1615 

Uganda Coalition on the International Criminal Court (UCICC) Annual Publication

Uganda Coalition on the International Criminal Court (UCICC)  

The Forum Magazine 2012


"This issue contains analyses of both critical and pro ICC nature. It is inclusive of different opinions, perceptions and misconceptions surrounding the work of the ICC, since the time of establishment.

This issue is most important for views on the work and impact of the ICC and outstanding considerations are:

(1) What have been the roles of the ICC as a world court since the time of establishment?

(2) The impact of the ICC since establishment.

(3) The common challenges faced by the ICC since the time of establishment.

(4) The different perceptions and misconceptions about the ICC as being another form of neo-colonialism.

(5) The future prospects of the ICC as a world court for future fair delivery of justice and the elimination of impunity.

The forum endeavours to uncover all minds of the researchers, academia and Civil Society Organizations. It is an opportunity for expression of thoughts geared towards the creation of a platform that is essentially beneficial to both the national and International community."

Download the PDF: http://www.ucicc.org/attachments/article/22/The%20Forum%20Magazine%20Issue%20No.%203,%202012%20%20Final%20Copy.pdf

African Efforts to Close the Impunity Gap

ISS Paper 241: 

Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions

Max du Plessis, Antoinette Louw & 

Ottilia Maunganidze

The position taken by the African Union towards the ICC creates the impression that African states are resistant to international criminal justice. This paper argues that the reality is quite different. The continent provides many examples of international justice in practice. A review of selected domestic and regional efforts suggests that a richer understanding of the Rome Statute’s ‘complementarity’ scheme is developing – one involving states, regional organisations and civil society working to close the impunity gap. Such actions are giving effect to the notion that while the ICC can provide justice through a few highly publicised trials, for justice to be brought home in any meaningful way, domestic action is essential.  

The publication of this paper was made possible with the support of the Governments of the Netherlands and Norway.

Download the full paper:  http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper241.pdf

Libyan NTC Must Commit to Criminal Justice to Bolster Credibility

JURIST Guest Columnist Ottilia Maunganidze, Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, says that for the NTC to establish credibility it must put an end to unlawful detentions, make certain that any arrests are carried out by lawful police forces and ensure humane treatment of detainees...

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On January 26, 2012, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, made a statement before the UN Security Council on the current human rights situation in Libya. In her statement, she highlighted key issues related to the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights. Pillay noted that the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya has taken some positive measures since coming into power in October 2011. However, she also highlighted that there had been reports of human rights abuses and that over 8,000 supporters loyal to the late leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, were arbitrarily detained and are being held in appalling conditions. Pillay's statement to the Security Council came just weeks before human rights advocacy organization Amnesty International (AI) released a report accusing the NTC of allowing the abuse and torture of supporters of former leader Gaddafi by unofficial militia. The AI report of February 16, 2012 underscores Pillay's concerns. The report itself is a product of an AI fact-finding mission to Libya in January and February 2012. The mission visited 11 facilities in Tripoli, al-Zawiya, Gharyan, Misrata and Sirte. The facilities are all currently used as detention facilities for suspected Gaddafi loyalists.

AI's report details systematic human rights abuses by militia of people in custody. People interviewed provided details of different forms of torture and resultant grievous bodily harm. According to the report, the alleged forms of torture used by the militia include, but are not limited to, beatings using various instruments such as sticks, whips and rifle butts. Several of the people interviewed by the AI mission said they suffered other forms of torture, including electric shocks, burns and threats of rape or death. In addition to those allegedly tortured, the mission also found that 12 detainees had died in custody.
Aid agency Medecins San Frontieres (MSF) has supported the findings of this report and Pillay's statement to the Security Council. According to the MSF, forensic examinations of some of those who died in detention provide evidence that such methods are still being used. Furthermore, MSF reports that some of their staff were asked by the militia in detention in Misrata to patch up prisoners midway through torture sessions so they could be taken back for more abuse. MSF in January said that its doctors had treated 115 people since August 2011 who had torture-related wounds and of those two people had died.
If the reported human rights violations are true and the militia is responsible for them, then the militia has violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, two international agreements to which Libya is a party. The ICCPR provides that everyone has the right to life and further that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." In addition, both the ICCPR and the Torture Convention expressly provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the alleged perpetrators should be brought to book for the acts of torture and the reported deaths. The AI report recommends that the NTC abruptly put an end to the unlawful detentions and ensure that any arrests are carried out by lawful police forces, ensure humane treatment of detainees and investigate the reported deaths of prisoners. However, as noted by Pillay, the reason that these crimes have gone largely unpunished is because the NTC seems to lack the requisite systems to oversee activities across the country. Consequently, some regions are not governed by the NTC, but instead by the militia.

In 2011, the NTC vowed to investigate allegations of human rights abuses after AI released their September 2011 report, which alleged that both sides to the Libyan conflict were responsible for human rights violations. The NTC also currently has in detention International Criminal Court (ICC) accused Saif al-Islam and Abdullah al-Senussi, who they intend to prosecute domestically despite criticisms from the ICC and the international community. Indeed, to date, no efforts have been made to freely and fairly prosecute both sides to the conflict. Unfortunately, this state of affairs closely mirrors the lack of commitment to criminal justice on the part of the Gaddafi government throughout his 42-year rule. If the NTC is to establish itself as a legitimate government, it will need to address this fundamental issue as well as ensure that it has authority over areas currently controlled by different militia groups.

Ottilia Maunganidze is a Researcher for the International Crime in Africa Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. Her main focus is on criminal justice mechanisms to deal with international crimes and the promotion and protection of human rights. Previously, she worked as a research intern for the African Security Analysis Programme, as a junior legal advisor at the Rhodes University Legal Aid Clinic, and as a student human rights education coordinator for the Rhodes University chapter of Amnesty International.

Suggested citation: Ottilia Maunganidze, NTC Must Commit to Criminal Justice to Bolster Credibility, JURIST - Hotline, Feb. 27, 2012, http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/02/ottilia-maunganidze-ntc-detentions.php.