Does the ICC case against Kenya's leaders undermine international peace and security?

13 November 2013

On 5 November 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) began handling the request to defer the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) cases in the Kenyan situation. The request, which was submitted on 1 November for consideration by non-permanent members Rwanda, Togo and Morocco under instruction from the African Union (AU), relates specifically to the cases against Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy, William Ruto.

Kenyatta and Ruto (together with Kenyan journalist Joshua Sang) face charges related to the violence that erupted after Kenya’s December 2007 elections, in which over 1 100 people died. Ruto and Sang’s trial began in September 2013, while Kenyatta’s trial is due to start on 5 February 2014 after a third postponement.

In October this year, the AU held an extraordinary summit at which the relationship between the ICC and Africa was discussed. Central to the discussions was the fact that all cases currently before the ICC are from African countries, including the indictment of two sitting heads of state. In its 12 October 2013 decision, the AU called for the Kenyan cases to be deferred and asked that the UNSC provide feedback on the deferral request by 12 November 2013, the date on which Kenyatta’s trial was scheduled to start.

Given that Kenyatta’s trial has been provisionally moved to February 2014, it remains to be seen whether the AU will still expect the UNSC to make a decision on deferral immediately. As things stand, the UNSC agenda for November does not include a session to discuss the deferral request. However, this is not to say such discussions will not be held, as the programme of work can be updated at any time.

Even if heard, despite support from Russia and China, the likelihood of the deferral being granted is slim, given that the United States, United Kingdom and France, who all hold the power to veto resolutions, insist that the ICC’s postponement of Kenyatta’s trial to February next year was sufficient. The views of the five permanent members of the UNSC notwithstanding, it is essential to assess the merits of the deferral request itself.

Article 16 of the ICC’s Rome Statute, in terms of which deferral requests can be made, statesthat ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with … for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the court to that effect ….’ Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UNSC to take measures to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’ if it has determined ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression’.

First, it is clear that Article 16 is intended for use in exceptional circumstances. Indeed, the UNSC has not, to date, deferred any ICC investigation or prosecution. The question now is whether continuing the court processes would undermine international peace and security. The AU’s request stresses that Kenya’s leaders need to focus on the ongoing fight against terrorism, especially following the attack on Westgate mall in September. They contend that having the president and deputy president of the country on trial jeopardises this.
This is not a widely supported view. Notably, Kenyan human rights organisations, in a letter to the president of the UNSC, stated that conflating the two issues would undermine accountability. The organisations emphasised that deferral on this basis would actually further embed impunity, which lends itself to susceptibility to terrorism.It cannot be denied that terrorism is a serious threat in Kenya and the Horn of Africa region. However, the UNSC has to decide whether this suffices as a basis upon which to allege that continuing the trials will compromise international peace and security. Indeed, counter-terrorism and international criminal justice are bedfellows in that they both seek to address serious crimes that have an adverse effect on global peace and security, and where the two intersect a balance must be struck. One should not be preferred over the other.

Second, the AU claims that by virtue of their positions as president and deputy president of Kenya, the two accused should not, for the duration of their terms, be prosecuted. The AU argues that doing so would undermine Kenyatta and Ruto’s official duties. If the deferral were granted on this basis, it would contradict Article 27 of the Rome Statute (which denies immunity for heads of state and other senior government officials). Significantly, it would mean the deferral would have to be renewed every 12 months for the duration of the Kenyan presidential term of five years. Presupposing that Kenyatta runs for a second term and wins, the deferral would have to be extended for a further five years.

This, as noted by Fergal Gaynor, the legal representative of victims in the case against Kenyatta, would further unduly delay any justice for the victims – assuming that Kenyatta is indeed found guilty. Similar sentiments have been voiced by civil society, including the Kenyan Human Rights Commission and the International Center for Policy and Conflict. Importantly, this argument of the AU contradicts Article 2(6) and Article 143(4) of the Kenyan constitution. Article 143(4) specifically prohibits the president’s immunity from criminal prosecution for ‘crime[s] for which the President may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and which prohibits such immunity’. The deputy president enjoys no immunity from prosecution under the Kenyan constitution.

Third, the AU contends that the criminal justice reforms undertaken in Kenya sufficiently allow for national prosecutions of those responsible for the post-election violence. While, on the face of it, this is in line with the ICC’s role as a court of last resort and is thus commendable, it is not a basis for deferral. Indeed, this was the primary basis of Kenya’s own deferral request made directly to the ICC in 2011, which the Court rejected. Supposing the criminal justice reforms were considered in making the decision, the argument ignores the fact that despite these reforms, there have been few prosecutions and convictions for serious crimes committed during the post-election violence. More importantly, if the ICC is to reconsider its jurisdiction in this situation, the Kenyans who stand accused by the Court are unlikely to be prosecuted domestically.

Further, in early September, Kenya’s parliament passed motions aimed at withdrawing Kenya from the Rome Statute and repealing the country’s International Crimes Act, which, among other things, provides a basis for the prosecution of ICC crimes in Kenya. This move would mean that not only are the president and his deputy free from prosecution for international crimes, but so are all Kenyans. This goes against the spirit and purpose of international criminal justice and is a blatant denial of recourse to justice for the victims of international crimes.
These are the key matters that the UNSC must grapple with in deciding whether or not to defer the ICC cases against Kenyatta and Ruto. At the end of the day, this will be put to a vote. A resolution on deferral can only be passed if at least nine countries are in favour and none of the five permanent members use their veto. That is unlikely, but not impossible.

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

A warlord faces justice at the ICC after six years on the run

 27 March 2013

 

On Tuesday 26 March, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel leader accused by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), appeared for the first time before the court. The appearance came a week after Ntaganda handed himself over to United States (US) embassy officials in Kigali, Rwanda and requested immediate transfer to the ICC. Through the cooperation of US and Rwandese authorities, Ntaganda was sent to the ICC on 22 March. While the reasons for his surrender are unclear, what is apparent is that Ntaganda has chosen to face justice at the ICC instead of continuing life as a fugitive.

The significance of this, for the ICC and international criminal justice in general, cannot be underestimated for a number of reasons. First, Ntaganda – after almost seven years on the run – is the first person for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant who has voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Eleven others for whom arrest warrants have been issued for situations in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Sudan and Uganda remain at large.

Second, the ICC received ready cooperation from the US and Rwanda. Both countries have not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC and thus have no direct obligations to the court. Despite this, their decisions to cooperate with the court and swiftly transfer Ntaganda to The Hague are indicative of support for international criminal justice.

Third, Ntaganda’s surrender comes at a time when the DRC is embroiled in ongoing conflict in the eastern provinces of the country. Ntaganda is said to have been integral in stoking the conflict in various ways from mid-1990 to date. However, it should be borne in mind that the crimes for which Ntaganda is presently charged relate to his activities in the eastern DRC region of Ituri (north of the war-torn Kivu provinces that border Rwanda) between 1 September 2002 and the end of September 2003.

For his alleged involvement in the Ituri conflict, Ntaganda – a Rwandan-born Congolese citizen – is charged with seven counts of war crimes, including the enlistment and conscription of children under the age of 15, the use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities, murder, attacks against the civilian population, rape and sexual slavery, and pillaging; and three counts of the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and sexual slavery, and persecution. During the time these offences were supposedly committed, Ntaganda was allegedly serving as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, or FPLC), the military arm of the Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, or UPC), a rebel movement in the eastern DRC. In this capacity, it is believed that Ntaganda reported directly to Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Lubanga Dyilo, currently in detention, made news in 2012 when he was the first person convicted by the ICC for the enlistment and use of children to actively participate in hostilities.

In addition to his involvement with the FPLC, Ntaganda – nicknamed ‘The Terminator’ – has over the years fought for several rebel groups. In the early 1990s, Ntaganda fought with the Rwandan Patriotic Army and from 2006 he was linked to the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, or CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda. Ntaganda is also one of the key figures allegedly behind the November 2008 Kiwanja massacre in which approximately 150 people were summarily executed in under two days.

Despite all this, Ntaganda was integrated into the Congolese army following the attempt at demilitarisation and reintegration of rebels from the CNDP, and the Congolese government made no effort to arrest and transfer him to the ICC. At the time of his surrender, Ntaganda had defected from the army and had been linked to another rebel movement, the M23, from early 2012. It is believed that the splitting of the M23 in February 2013 following infighting prompted Ntaganda to flee from the DRC to Rwanda.

Despite several promises (and having previously cooperated with the ICC), the Congolese government did not arrest Ntaganda. Interestingly, the DRC itself has over the years issued arrest warrants for Ntaganda for allegedly committing, among other offences, torture, murder, illegal detention and arbitrary arrest. These warrants of arrest and those issued by the ICC were not executed, which further frustrated those who wanted to bring Ntaganda to justice.

The failure by the Congolese government to arrest Ntaganda and transfer him to the ICC – as it had done with Lubanga Dyilo – highlighted one of the major challenges facing the court: that it does not have its own police force and so relies on support and cooperation from Rome Statute states parties to make arrests. Ntaganda’s decision to surrender himself to the court is significant because it shows that the ICC can secure indictees for trial if they voluntarily surrender, even to non-state parties that are not bound by the ICC’s statute.

There are three ways in which an ICC accused can come before the court. First, when a summons to appear is issued, the accused can voluntarily present him or herself to the ICC. Second, when an arrest warrant is issued, the authorities in a particular state can apprehend and surrender the accused to the ICC. Third, when an accused for whom an arrest warrant has been issued hands him or herself over to the court. Given that when arrest warrants are issued this is done precisely because it is doubtful that a suspect will voluntarily appear, the third option – which Ntaganda recently took – tends to be the least likely. More so for ICC cases, which tend to focus on people in positions of power because of the prosecutorial strategy of going after those most responsible for international crimes.

Ntaganda`s appearance in the dock at the ICC on 26 March sends a strong message to perpetrators of international crimes that they too may face justice one day – whether they are delivered to court after arrest or because circumstances push them to voluntarily surrender. While this is only the beginning of the proceedings against Ntaganda, it is a highlight at a time when the ICC continues to struggle with securing the arrest of individuals like Ugandan Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan.


Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

Original posting: http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1615 

Uganda Coalition on the International Criminal Court (UCICC) Annual Publication

Uganda Coalition on the International Criminal Court (UCICC)  

The Forum Magazine 2012


"This issue contains analyses of both critical and pro ICC nature. It is inclusive of different opinions, perceptions and misconceptions surrounding the work of the ICC, since the time of establishment.

This issue is most important for views on the work and impact of the ICC and outstanding considerations are:

(1) What have been the roles of the ICC as a world court since the time of establishment?

(2) The impact of the ICC since establishment.

(3) The common challenges faced by the ICC since the time of establishment.

(4) The different perceptions and misconceptions about the ICC as being another form of neo-colonialism.

(5) The future prospects of the ICC as a world court for future fair delivery of justice and the elimination of impunity.

The forum endeavours to uncover all minds of the researchers, academia and Civil Society Organizations. It is an opportunity for expression of thoughts geared towards the creation of a platform that is essentially beneficial to both the national and International community."

Download the PDF: http://www.ucicc.org/attachments/article/22/The%20Forum%20Magazine%20Issue%20No.%203,%202012%20%20Final%20Copy.pdf

African Efforts to Close the Impunity Gap

ISS Paper 241: 

Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions

Max du Plessis, Antoinette Louw & 

Ottilia Maunganidze

The position taken by the African Union towards the ICC creates the impression that African states are resistant to international criminal justice. This paper argues that the reality is quite different. The continent provides many examples of international justice in practice. A review of selected domestic and regional efforts suggests that a richer understanding of the Rome Statute’s ‘complementarity’ scheme is developing – one involving states, regional organisations and civil society working to close the impunity gap. Such actions are giving effect to the notion that while the ICC can provide justice through a few highly publicised trials, for justice to be brought home in any meaningful way, domestic action is essential.  

The publication of this paper was made possible with the support of the Governments of the Netherlands and Norway.

Download the full paper:  http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper241.pdf

Power and Prosecution - Pouvoir et Poursuite

Kai Ambos  & Ottilia Anna Maunganidze (Eds.)

Power and Prosecution - Pouvoir et Poursuite

Challenges and Opportunities for International Criminal Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa - Défis et Opportunités pour la Justice Pénale Internationale en Afrique SubSaharienne

Göttinger Studien zu den Kriminalwissenschaften - Band 24

This book contains some of the papers that were presented at the fi rst meeting of the newly formed African Expert Study Group on International Criminal Law/ Groupe des Experts Africaines en Droit Pénal International held in September 2011 in Brussels, Belgium. The group was established under the auspices of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue (hereinafter ‘MDPD’) and the Rule of Law programme of the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (‘KAS’) in 2010 modeled on the successful sister group in Latin America. This latter group was originally founded as an expert group to monitor the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) in Latin America within the framework of cooperation between KAS’ regional Rule of Law Programme and the Department for Foreign and International Law of the Institute for Criminal Law and Criminal Justice of the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in 2002. 

The newly formed African group consists of judicial experts with both academic and practical background from various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The importance of such a group for the African continent cannot be overestimated. Africa plays a vital role in international criminal law and justice, both as an active player at the ICC and at the regional and national level. As for the group’s composition and outreach, the aim is to broaden regional representation and further consolidate membership. In 2012, the group will meet in Nairobi, Kenya to deal with topics surrounding the ‘Potential for the domestic prosecution of international crimes in Africa.’ 

Topics for future meetings abound given the multi-faceted African legal and political practice regarding international criminal justice in general and the ICC in particular. The group should in particular monitor the recent international or transnational criminal justice developments at the regional African level as well as relevant national developments. (Excerpt from the introduction by Kai Ambos)

Published: 2012

Book launch: http://www.kas.de/bruessel/en/events/52492/

Download: http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/univerlag/2012/GSK24_ambos_power.pdf 

Purchase Softcover, 202 S.: 26,00 Euro
(ISBN 978-3-86395-078-1)  http://www.univerlag.uni-goettingen.de/content/list.php?q=Kai+Ambos&cat=result&details=isbn-978-3-86395-078-1

Implications of Another African Case as Mali Self-refers to the ICC

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze & Antoinette Louw,  Researcher & Senior Research Fellow,  Transnational Threats and International Crimes Division, ISS Pretoria

On 18 July 2012, Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), released a press statement confirming receipt of a referral of the situation in Mali by the country’s interim Minister of Justice. In terms of the 13 July 2012 referral letter, the government of Mali alleges that gross human rights violations and war crimes have been committed in the country, especially in the northern region. The alleged crimes include the summary executions of soldiers, rape of women and young girls, killing of civilians, the recruitment of child soldiers, torture, pillaging, enforced disappearances, and the destruction of property (including government buildings, humanitarian installations, religious establishments and gravesites). The prosecutor indicated that her office would conduct preliminary investigations into the alleged international crimes in accordance with the Rome Statute of the ICC.

The referral is the first received by the new prosecutor since she took office on 15 June this year. Notably, Mali is the fifth African country that has formally requested the ICC to investigate crimes in its territory and, if formal investigations are instituted, will be the eighth situation before the ICC – all of which are in Africa. This additional African situation comes at a time when the ICC is under fire for not opening investigations in other parts of the world. Some critics even go so far as to contend that the ICC is targeting Africa. 

As the new prosecutor begins her tenure at the ICC, it is widely agreed that one of her office’s main challenges is to ensure that the court rebuilds its legitimacy, especially in Africa. To do so the ICC must open formal investigations into situations outside the continent. However, this is easier said than done, as the additional self-referral by Mali – an African country – shows. Although self-referrals do signify support for the ICC by the governments concerned, they are not without their own controversies. For the most part, self-referrals now elicit more scepticism than compliments for the ICC. This has been the case with the self-referrals made by the governments of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as the Côte d’Ivoire case, which – although not a member of the ICC’s Rome Statute – requested the ICC’s intervention after accepting the court’s jurisdiction. In all four cases, allegations are that these requests were intended to cripple government adversaries rather than end impunity for grave crimes, or that the cases represent `victor`s justice` rather than real justice for all sides to the conflict. 

Similar criticisms are likely to be levelled at the Mali referral for a number of reasons. Politically, the stakes for control over a new government are now high. The violence that grips the country followed a coup d’état staged by mutinying soldiers. The coup, which began on 21 March 2012 when soldiers seized the presidential palace, state media and other buildings, forced then president Amadou Toumani Touré into hiding and eventually led to his resignation on 8 April. Consequently, the country’s constitution was suspended. The situation in Mali prior to and after the coup has been tense. At present, an interim government – comprised mostly of technocrats – that was formed following the resignation of the president is running the country. This situation has been exacerbated by the Tuareg insurgency in the north of the country, where rebels have taken control of most of northern Mali and declared the independent nation of Azawad. The self-referral could thus be characterised as an attempt by the interim government – which is weak and in search of support and legitimacy both locally and abroad – to put down the rebellion in the north, and eliminate opposition from those who might seek to destabilise a new government.

The political context aside, the Mali referral nevertheless signals welcome and continued support for the ICC and its goals in Africa. First, Mali’s decision to refer shows that the government would like to see an end to the commission of international crimes within the country and that it believes the ICC can help in achieving this. Second (and unlike any of the other self-referrals), the Mali referral has the support of the West African region: on 9 July 2012 ECOWAS’ Contact Group on Mali (composed of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria and Togo) recommended that the situation be referred to the ICC. The seven-country contact group also called for the formation of a government of national unity, having already (on 15 May) released a statement accusing the military junta of blocking the return to civilian rule and threatening to impose sanctions.

With political support from both Mali and ECOWAS in place it is now up to the ICC to proceed in a manner that mitigates the criticisms that have been levelled at the other self-referrals. A procedural and transparent approach that emphasises the requirements of the Rome Statute at every step will assist in this regard. For example, if the ICC initiates formal investigations in Mali, it will be doing so in line with article 17 of the Rome Statute that allows the court to intervene only if the government in the country concerned is unwilling or unable to take action. Noting that Mali’s current government is an interim administration, it is unlikely to have the capacity to prosecute the alleged perpetrators itself even if the political will to do so exists. Thus a referral by Mali signifies commitment by the state to end impunity and paves the way for future cooperation with the ICC in respect of investigations and possible arrests. (It is worth noting that this is an important consideration that lends support to cases coming to the ICC via self-referrals: the court lacks its own police force, which means it relies heavily on the cooperation of the states in which it works. Practically, self-referrals are understandably an attractive option for the ICC.) 

The ‘willing and able’ test referred to above forms part of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)’s obligations under article 53 of the Rome Statute to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into the situation in Mali. To do this, the prosecution must determine whether the ICC has jurisdiction, whether the matter is admissible, and whether proceedings would be in the interests of justice. If the OTP decides to proceed, it is imperative that investigations cover all sides to the conflict from the outset in order to offset accusations that self-referrals result in victor’s justice. These procedures, and their outcomes, need to be publicly explained by the OTP. This is neither an unreasonable requirement nor something foreign to the work of a prosecutor. At the national level prosecutions do not occur in a vacuum, with local courts similarly being vulnerable to abuse by political leaders determined to sideline their opposition. The onus is therefore on the OTP to carefully manage the selection of cases and subsequent investigations and prosecutions. Doing so will help ameliorate negative perceptions about the ICC.

Although it’s still early days, the OTP’s statement on the Mali self-referral demonstrates an awareness of the sensitivities around these types of cases. In her statement Bensouda outlines clearly the origins of the referral, and the steps, in terms of the Rome Statute, that the OTP will now take to determine whether a formal investigation can be launched. This approach is a good start and should assist the ICC in building its legitimacy despite the addition of yet another African situation to the court’s caseload.
 

Malawi's Stance on al-Bashir is in Line with its International Obligations

On Friday 8 June 2012, the cabinet of Malawi resolved not to host the next African Union (AU) Summit because the AU insisted that all Heads of State - including Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir - be invited to attend.

Al-Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide allegedly committed in Darfur. The decision by Malawi's President Joyce Banda not to allow al-Bashir into her country because of Malawi's international obligations has led to widespread reaction throughout Africa.

Malawi's Vice-President Khumbo Kachali made the announcement on Friday 8 June that Malawi would not submit to pressure from the AU to invite Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to the upcoming AU summit. Kachali stated that, 'much as Malawi has obligations to the AU, it also has other obligations (and) the Cabinet has decided not to host the summit'.

It has been widely reported that President Joyce Banda's decision not to invite al-Bashir and the pursuant decision by the Malawi cabinet are informed by the country's efforts to regain international favour. This kind of speculation could have political implications for Malawi, especially for its relationship with the AU going forward. The political issues surrounding this decision have unfortunately overshadowed the legal dimension of the issue. Of importance in this regard are the United Nations (UN) Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Rome Statute of the ICC. All these instruments, which are binding on Malawi, have specific provisions aimed at promoting global peace and the rule of law, and ending impunity.

First, the UN Charter enunciates as one of its principles the need to maintain international peace and security. Malawi, as a member state of the UN, is bound to its decisions. Under Article 103, the UN Charter provides that obligations under the Charter prevail over any other obligations if there is a conflict. It should be noted that the situation in Darfur was referred to the ICC pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1593 in 2005. The UN Security Council invoked its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and provisions in the ICC Statute to oblige the Government of Sudan and 'all other parties to the conflict in Darfur' to cooperate with the ICC (which includes the arrest and surrender of suspects to the court).

Second, one of the primary objectives of the AU is to achieve peace and security in Africa. Specifically, the Constitutive Act of the AU provides a legal framework for the continental organ to fight impunity. Articles 4(h) and (o) of the Constitutive Act authorise the AU to intervene in member states to stop war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and ultimately to prevent impunity. However, it should be noted that this intervention is often political.

Last, but certainly not least, is the fact that Malawi's decision is in line with the country's responsibilities under the Rome Statute of the ICC. As an ICC member state, Malawi is obliged to cooperate fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and where requested to arrest al-Bashir (and any other suspects wanted by the ICC) if he visits the country and surrender him to the court. Malawi's decision to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the ICC should he enter its territory is not unique. Indeed, Malawi's stance is not the first, nor shall it - hopefully - be the last in Africa.

In April 2009, al-Bashir - although invited - decided not to travel to South Africa to attend President Jacob Zuma's inauguration. This decision came after South African authorities and civil society took steps to exercise the country's domestic and international criminal law obligations with regard to al-Bashir. Following similar actions by governments and African civil society organisations, other states have found diplomatic solutions to either avoid al-Bashir's visits or move the venue of important meetings to the territory of non-states parties.

Notably, al-Bashir cancelled trips to Uganda in 2009 and 2010 over fears that he would be arrested, and also did not attend Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's inauguration in May 2011. Furthermore,
al-Bashir did not attend the ceremony of the 50th anniversary of the independence of the Central African Republic (CAR) in December 2010. Both Uganda and CAR are states parties to the ICC Statute and referred the situations in their respective countries for investigation and prosecution at the ICC. Later that December, al-Bashir cancelled his trip to Zambia (also a state party to the ICC Statute) to attend the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region following international protest. Instead, Sudanese foreign minister Ali Karti and minerals minister Abdel-Baki Al-Gailani attended the summit. Other African countries like Botswana have made it clear that al-Bashir is not welcome.

Nevertheless, since the arrest warrant was issued in 2009, al-Bashir has been able to travel to several countries that are obliged to arrest and surrender him to the ICC, including ICC member states Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, and Malawi in 2010 and 2011. It is worth noting that following his first visit to Kenya in August 2010, civil society action resulted in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) moving its October 2010 special summit on Sudan from Nairobi to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to
avert a potential diplomatic quandary over al-Bashir's attendance. Further, civil society was in 2011 able to secure a warrant for his arrest from a Kenyan High Court, thereby preventing subsequent visits.

It is clear that African states are divided on the al-Bashir issue. This is despite AU decisions in 2009, 2010, 2011 and January 2012 in which the AU called on all its member states not to cooperate with the ICC in respect of al-Bashir's arrest warrants. The AU argues that, as a head of state, al-Bashir enjoys immunity and should therefore not be prosecuted while in office. The AU also contends that arresting al-Bashir would not be in the interests of peace and would undermine its ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Sudan and South Sudan.

Despite the AU's decisions on al-Bashir, the facts of the Sudanese president's trips noted above show that some African states have chosen to abide by their domestic and international legal obligations rather than the AU position. These countries, some of which have vowed to arrest al-Bashir, are acting consistently with the rule of law requirements of international criminal justice. However, others abide by the AU decisions even though this means flouting the rules of the ICC.

Interestingly, some countries like Malawi have shown a shift in opinion. In October 2011, before the death of Malawi's former President Bingu wa Mutharika, al-Bashir was able to travel to that country for a regional economic summit. However, with the change in government, the stance in Malawi on international criminal justice has also significantly shifted. But is it enough?

The fact that al-Bashir has not yet been arrested and surrendered to the ICC is evidence that for international criminal justice to succeed, countries, especially ICC states parties, must do more than take principled positions. They must be ready and able to apprehend people indicted by the ICC. It is the lack of full commitment to cooperating with the ICC that led the court's outgoing chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to request the UN Security Council to consider calling on all UN member states and regional organisations to carry out the arrest warrants for al-Bashir and other indicted Sudanese officials. It remains to be seen whether the UN Security Council will oblige and what implications such a move will have.

Malawi should be applauded for its principled and legally correct position on al-Bashir. At the same time, the AU's determination to bring together all heads of state, especially those directly involved in continental conflicts, is understandable and in line with its chief mandate to promote peace and security. Thus moving the summit to a non-state party to the ICC is arguably the right result under the circumstances. However, it is unfortunate that once again peace and justice have been set up against each other in such a polarising manner. It will serve the interests of peace, justice and the rule of law if African leaders are proactive in finding solutions that are both diplomatic and not in breach of international law.

Ottilia Anna Maunganidze is a researcher in the Transnational Threats and International Crime Division of the ISS www.issafrica.org

Rwanda`s New Genocide Cases a Milestone for Domestic Prosecutions of International Crimes

On 6 April 1994, Rwandese president Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira were killed in a plane crash. The two were travelling from Tanzania to Rwanda following a heads of state summit in Dar es Salaam. After the crash widespread violence erupted in Rwanda resulting in the deaths of approximately 800 000 people over the next 100 days. Although it has been alleged that the plane was shot down, to date the perpetrators have not been identified. The targets of the Rwandan genocide were predominantly from the Tutsi ethnic group, although moderate individuals from the Hutu ethnic group who were believed to be sympathetic to the then opposition Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) were also among the victims.

Eighteen years after the genocide, the quest for justice for the crimes committed in 1994 continues. An international criminal tribunal was set up by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prosecute those who bore the greatest responsibility for the Rwandan genocide. To date, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has dealt with over 80 cases, securing convictions in 59 of these. The ICTR has achieved important results as far as accountability for the genocide is concerned. However, the tribunal has been criticized for taking too long, being costly to run and prosecuting a small amount of people in comparison to domestic justice processes in Rwanda. Furthermore, the ICTR has been criticized for focusing its prosecutions on Hutus.

In addition to those prosecuted by the ICTR, the Rwandan local and traditional gacaca courts have prosecuted hundreds of thousands of individuals. The combined efforts of the ICTR, the local courts and the gacaca have resulted in a unique and comprehensive approach to ensuring justice for the crimes committed during the 1994 genocide. However, despite overwhelming success, justice has largely remained one-sided and slow. In a 2011 report on the gacaca, international human rights organisation Human Rights Watch criticized the gacaca system and accused the Rwandan government of political interference in the trials. In addition, many senior officials believed to be behind the genocide remain at large and in exile in other countries. These individuals, if extradited to Rwanda, can only face trial before the High Court and not the gacaca.Since 1995, the Rwandan government has sent over 40 extradition requests to various countries.

These requests for the extradition of individuals to Rwanda to stand trial have largely been unsuccessful. However, recent events suggest that those who remain at large could face trial in Rwanda at last.

On 24 January 2012, Canada deported alleged genocide suspect Leon Mugesera back to Rwanda. Mugesera appeared before the Rwandan High Court on 2 February 2012 where he was charged for his involvement in the 1994 genocide. Mugesera, a member of the MRND – the former ruling party in Rwanda – is accused of inciting and planning the genocide. The charges against Mugesera are based on a speech he gave at an MRND party meeting in 1992, in which he called upon people from the majority Hutu ethnic group to exterminate the minority Tutsis who he likened to cockroaches.

Mugesera’s case is the second high profile case that will be dealt with by Rwandan domestic courts. His deportation came just days after the ICTR handed over referral and prosecution materials in the case of Jean Bosco Uwinkindi to the Rwandan courts. Uwinkindi is charged with the crimes of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity for his involvement in atrocities in Kigal Rural Prefecture.

Uwinkindi’s transfer is the first handover of a case by the ICTR to the national courts of Rwanda. The Prosecutor of the ICTR, Hassan Bubacar Jallow, regards the transfer of the Uwinkindi case as a watershed moment for both the ICTR and Rwanda. Indeed, the transfer of the Uwinkindi case to Rwanda is an important step in acknowledging the ability of the Rwandan criminal justice system to deal with serious crimes.

In addition to the cases of Mugesera and Uwinkindi, in 2011 the US returned to Rwanda two genocide fugitives, Jean-Marie Vianney Mudahinyuka and Marie-Claire Mukeshimana. More recently, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also approved the extradition of another genocide suspect, Sylvere Ahorugeze, who is currently resident in Sweden. The decision of the ECHR, although subject to review, is important for international criminal justice as it has a broad impact, particularly in Europe where it is believed hundreds of Rwandan genocide suspects reside.

The decision of ECHR is the first of a regional human rights court on the extradition of a genocide suspect to Rwanda. As such the judgment sets a precedent for Rwanda to seek extradition of other suspects resident abroad. This decision follows refusals by courts in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to allow the extradition of genocide suspects to Rwanda. Most of these decisions were based on the fact that the courts were not satisfied that the Rwandan judiciary could guarantee a fair trial to extradited genocide suspects.

It is no surprise therefore that the Prosecutor General of Rwanda, Martin Ngoga, has applauded these recent decisions as evidence that the international community believes in the Rwandan criminal justice system. He credits the Rwandan government’s legal reforms for these positive developments. Notably, in 2007 Rwanda abolished the death penalty. Furthermore, since 2008 Rwanda has engaged in capacity building projects aimed at enhancing the performance of the judiciary and ensuring fairness and efficacy of the courts. In addition new courthouses and detention facilities were constructed.

However, despite these recent decisions and the efforts of the Rwandan government to reform the criminal justice system, concerns remain. One of the major concerns relates to whether the Rwandan courts have the requisite capacity to deal with the potential influx of high profile cases. In addition, until recently most courts – the ICTR and those in Europe – did not believe that the Rwandan courts would be able to provide free and fair trials for genocide suspects. Perceptions are changing, albeit slowly. The satisfactory performance of the Rwandan courts will be particularly important for Rwanda’s continued efforts to ensure accountability given that both the ICTR and the gacaca courts will end trials in mid-2012. As a result, the latest genocide trials in Rwanda will be watched closely as they will be the litmus test for any future extraditions or transfers to Rwanda.

ISS Today article written by Ottilia Anna Maunganidze, Researcher, Transnational Threats and International Crime Division, ISS Pretoria

ISS Africa

Why International Criminal Court's work is so significant for Africa: Cote d'Ivoire investigation

*A little late posting this... but better late than never I suppose*

A last refuge for justice


October 12 2011 at 07:53am


At the end of September, the judges of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber III authorised the court’s prosecutor to launch formal investigations in Ivory Coast. The investigations will focus on the violence that occurred in Ivory Coast from November 28, 2010, following the release of the results of the second round of elections in which the opposition movement, led by Alassane Ouattara, was declared victorious.


The post-election violence in Ivory Coast lasted more than five months. During this period, reports of widespread murder, rape and forced disappearances abounded. As a result of the protracted violence, 3 000 people died and about one million more were internally displaced.

While relative stability has returned to the west African country, according to the UN Mission in Ivory Coast, more than 30 000 people remain internally displaced. As per ICC procedure in matters such as these, the authorisation by the court’s judges followed a request on June 23, 2011 from the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to begin the investigations. Ocampo’s request stemmed from an invitation by the Ivorian government to investigate crimes committed in the country.


The judges’ decision is a welcome development in ensuring that justice is served for crimes committed in Ivory Coast. However, the decision comes at a time when the African Union’s relationship with the ICC remains sour. Since 2009, when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the AU has called on African states not to co-operate with the ICC.


Ironically, several African countries, notably Botswana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa, have consistently voiced their support for the ICC and remain committed to co-operating with it.


Furthermore, several African states – Ivory Coast included – have shown continued support for the ICC by calling on the court to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in their countries.


The first situations before the ICC came about after states that are signatories to the ICC’s Rome Statute asked the court to investigate crimes committed in their respective countries. These states are Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.


The ICC can also claim jurisdiction over a matter in a state party if the prosecutor, of his own accord, requests authorisation from the ICC’s pre-trial chamber judges to initiate investigations. To date, the prosecutor has only exercised this proprio motu power once, in the case of Kenya’s post-election violence.

The UN Security Council may refer situations to the ICC in countries that are not state parties to the Rome Statute. The security council has exercised this power in respect of two situations before the court: those of Sudan’s western province, Darfur, and Libya.


With the recent authorisation of investigations in Ivory Coast, four of the seven cases before the ICC are the result of choices made by African states themselves. This is a clear sign of acceptance by Africans of the importance of the ICC in assisting them in meeting their obligations to end impunity and promote international criminal justice.


While Ivory Coast has not ratified the Rome Statute, it has formally accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. The first declaration accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction was made in April 2003 by then-president Laurent Gbagbo.

In December 2010 and again in May 2011, incumbent Alassane Ouattara made similar declarations and invited the ICC prosecutor to investigate crimes committed since November 2010.

The peculiar situation in which Ivory Coast has accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, without taking the broader step of ratifying the Rome Statute, creates an interesting precedent for the authorities of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The Palestinian authorities are bidding for statehood and in January 2009, made a similar declaration granting the ICC jurisdiction over the crimes allegedly committed by Israel during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. If the occupied Palestinian territories are granted statehood, the Palestinian authorities may also wish to refer the situation in their territories to the ICC. However, pending the outcome of the Palestinians’ bid for statehood, to date all the cases before the ICC are from African countries.


This African focus has led to some criticism of the ICC as targeting Africa. This criticism, however, ignores important considerations.


Firstly, 32 African countries have voluntarily ratified the Rome Statute and Ivory Coast has voluntarily accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction.

Secondly, the criticism fails to acknowledge the fact that the majority of the situations before the ICC areas are a result of self-referral by the government of the country concerned.

Furthermore, the criticism overlooks that the ICC serves as a court of last resort, which only intervenes when a state is either unwilling or unable to prosecute alleged perpetrators of international crimes.

Lastly, the criticism does not acknowledge the pervasive culture of impunity and weak criminal justice systems in Africa – factors that have contributed significantly to the continued commission of international crimes on the continent.

The ICC exists to fill the impunity gap and to ensure justice for persons responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern. The ICC is furthermore complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The preamble of the Rome Statute stresses that the first commitment by states is to themselves “end impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.


Ivory Coast’s recent invitation to the ICC, alongside the ratification of the Rome Statute by 32 African states, are examples of African countries fulfilling their obligations to promote international criminal justice and end impunity.


The fact that at present, all the situations before the ICC are from African countries indicates not only that unacceptable levels of violence bedevil our continent, but it also presents an opportunity for Africa to be at the centre of developments in international criminal justice.


Even as certain African leaders criticise the ICC’s involvement on the continent, for Ivorian victims of mass atrocities, that involvement sends out a symbolically important message that their suffering has not been forgotten and that those responsible may meet justice, through the work of a faraway court in The Hague.


Ottilia Anna Maunganidze is a researcher in the International Crime in Africa Programme at the Institute for Security Studies.


http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/a-last-refuge-for-justice-1.1155343